This paper extends previous work on propagating qualitative uncertainty in networks in which a general approach to qualitative propagation was discussed. The work presented here includes results that make it possible to perform evidential and intercausal reasoning, in addition to the predictive reasoning already covered, in networks quanti ed with probability, possibility and Dempster-Shafer belief values. The use of these forms of reasoning, which include the phenomenon of \explaining away", is illustrated with the use of a medical example.
Introduction
In the past few years there has been considerable interest in qualitative approaches to reasoning under uncertainty|approaches which do not make use of precise numerical values of the type used by conventional probability theory. These approaches range from systems of argumentation 1;2;3 to systems for nonmonotonic reasoning 4 and abstractions of precise quantitative systems 5;6 . Qualitative abstractions of probabilistic networks, in particular, have proved popular, nding use in areas in which the full numerical formalism is either unnecessary or inappropriate. Applications have been reported in planning 6 , explanation 7 , diagnosis 8 and engineering design 9 . In qualitative probabilistic networks, the focus is rather di erent from that of ordinary probabilistic systems. Whereas in probabilistic networks 10 the main goal is to establish the probabilities of hypotheses when particular observations are made, in qualitative systems the main aim is to establish how values change. Thus, given information that a patient has a fever, and given that we are interested in whether the patient has measles, the aim in a qualitative probabilistic system is to establish how the probability of measles changes rather than what the probability of measles is. Since the approach is qualitative, the size of the change is not required. The only consideration is whether the probability increases, in which case the change is positive, written as +], decreases in which case the change is negative ?], or does Further results in qualitative uncertainty 2 not change in which case the change is zero 0]. In some cases it is not possible to resolve the change with any precision so that its value remains unknown, and it is written as ?]. Clearly this information is rather weak, but as the applications show it is su cient for some tasks. Furthermore, reasoning with qualitative probabilities is much more e cient than reasoning with precise probabilities, since computation is quadratic in the size of the network 5 rather than NP-hard 11 . The popularity of qualitative probabilistic networks prompted work on abstractions of other uncertainty handling formalisms 12;13;14 , providing what is essentially a generalisation of the approach provided by qualitative probabilistic networks 15 . This approach uses techniques from qualitative reasoning 16 to determine the behaviour of the formalisms. Given two hypotheses H and G whose probabilities are interesting, the approach relates p(H) to p(G) by establishing the qualitative value of dp(H)=dp(G). Initial results 12 demonstrated how this approach could be used to propagate qualitative probability, possibility 17;18 and Dempster-Shafer belief 19 values in singly connected networks in a predictive direction|the direction in which the conditional values were elicited|and suggested how this propagation might be used to integrate information expressed in the di erent formalisms. This paper extends the work in a number of ways.
After a brief statement of some basic ideas in Section 2, Section 3 gives results that make use of Bayes' rule and its extensions to other formalisms to enable evidential reasoning. Another new reasoning pattern, intercausal reasoning 20;21 , is introduced in Section 4 allowing the propagation of values between the ancestors of a node which represents a variable that is known to be true. To my knowledge this is the rst time that this style of reasoning has been explored in possibility and evidence theories. The use of the results is shown on a medical example in Section 5, and the solution of the example necessitates a discussion of a means of integrating the di erent formalisms.
Basic notions
This work is set in the framework of singly connected networks in which the nodes represent variables, and the edges represent explicit dependencies between the variables. When the edges of such graphs are quanti ed with probability values they are those studied by Pearl 10 , when possibility values are used the graphs are those of Fonck and Straszecka 22 and when belief values are used the graphs are those studied by Shafer et al. 23 and Smets 24 . Since we deal with values that may be probabilities, possibilities or beliefs we need a general way of referring to them, and so we de ne a certainty value:
De nition 1 The certainty value of a variable X taking value x, val(x), is either the probability of x, p(x), the possibility of x, (x), or the belief in x, bel(x).
Later on we will also need to distinguish between upper certainty values, written val ( ) which like possibility measure the upper bound on the degree to which a Further results in qualitative uncertainty 3 hypothesis might occur, and lower certainty values, written val ( ) like belief which measure the lower bound on the degree to which a hypothesis must occur. This distinction is necessary in order to relate the di erent formalisms discussed in this paper, since for these the upper certainty value of a hypothesis may be established from the lower certainty value of the complementary hypothesis 25 :
val (x) = 1 ? val (:x)
(1) Thus a belief value may be related to a plausibility value 19 , and a possibility value may be related to a necessity value 17 . In the case of probability theory, of course, the upper certainty value and the lower certainty value coincide.
Each node in a graph represents a binary valued variable. We use the convention that the name of the node is a capital letter, often related to the name of the variable it represents, and that the possible values taken by the variable are indicated by lower case letters, usually the lower case letters appropriate to the name of the node. Thus a node X represents some variable, say \Xerxes is alive" whose possible values are x and :x with the usual implication that x stands for the value \Xerxes is alive is true" while :x stands for the value \Xerxes is alive is false". The set of values fx; :xg is sometimes written as X. The probability values associated with X are written as p(x) and p(:x), and the possibility values associated with X as (x) and (:x). Belief values may be assigned to any subset of the values of X, so it is possible to have up to three beliefs associated with X|bel(fxg), bel(f:xg) and bel(fx; :xg). For simplicity these will be written as bel(x), bel(:x) and bel(x :x), and we will abuse even this rather lapse notation later on by using expressions such as X 2 fx; x :xg, x i 2 X to mean that x i can take the values x or :x. The use of binary values is purely a matter of convenience since it makes the results simpler to understand and easier to obtain. It is possible to generalise the results 14 . Given two nodes in the network, A and C, which are connected we are interested in the way in which a change in val(a), say, in uences val(c) and val(:c). We can model the impact of evidence that a ects the value of A in terms of the change in certainty value of a and :a, relative to their value before the evidence was known, and use knowledge about the way that a change in val(a) a ects val(c) and val(:c) to propagate the e ect of the evidence. We de ne the following relationships that describe how the value of a variable X changes when the value of a variable Y is altered by new evidence: If it is not possible to determine which of these relationships between val(x) and val(y) hold, then the relationship between val(x) and val(y) is said to be indeterminate. These relationships are distinguished because of the way that they relate to the keystone of our method which is the use of qualitative derivatives. The relationship between val(x) and val(y) is charaterised by the derivative dval(x)=dval(y). When the value of the derivative is known, the change in val(x) can be established from the value of the change in val(y) y :
Now, we are only interested here in the direction of the change, so we are only interested in the qualitative values 16 of the above terms: 
where \ " is qualitative addition 6;16 . The di erence between the partial derivatives and the (total) derivatives used above is that the latter take account of changes in val(:y).
Despite the appeal of the relationship between the terms de ned in De nitions 2{4 and the qualitative value of the derivatives, these terms are not su cient to describe every relationship we come across. We also require the following: Clearly the relationships between val(x) and val(y) described by these two terms are related to those introduced previously since val(x) follows val(y) if and only if it both follows val(y) up and follows it down. We can also introduce the idea that the relationship between val(x) and val(y) is not known exactly, so that it may be the case that val(x) changes when val(y) does but it may also be the case that val(x) does not change when val(y) does. For this we need four new de nitions, the rst two amend the de nitions of \follows" and \vary inversely with": We could also introduce further relationships relating to the sub-parts of the \varies inversely" relation and their \maybe" counterparts, but these have not been found necessary to date. The results are trivial to establish, as they were in the original papers in which they were introduced 6;16 . The product of an increase in value (left column), and a positive derivative (top row) is an increase in value, while the product of an increase in value and a derivative that indicates the relationship in question is \follows down" is no change. The e ect of \may follow" and similar derivatives may be established by considering the two e ects that they represent. Thus the e ect of combining Given this background, it is clear that to determine the change at node C given the change at node A we may use either total or partial derivatives: 
When the value at a node is in uenced by changes at several other nodes, we may calculate the overall change by using the principle of superposition 26 which allows us to obtain the compound change by simply summing the changes that would be induced by each in uencing node on its own. Thus if there is a node D which is a ected by changes at C and another node B, the overall change at D is given by the sum of the change at D due to the change at C and the change at D due to the change at B. This sum may be established by the use of either total or Further results in qualitative uncertainty 7 partial derivatives:
In this paper we use total derivatives to manipulate probability and belief values and, because of the di culty of determining how (x) a ects (:x) 14 , we use partial derivatives to manipulate possibility values. In fact, strictly speaking, it is not possible to establish any kind of derivative in possibility theory since the maximum and minimum combinators used by the theory may not be di erentiated. However, it is possible to establish the sign of val(x)= val(y) (the way in which a small change in value rather than an in nitesimal change in value is propagated) and this is what will be manipulated in the case of possibility theory. I trust that the reader will excuse the slight abuse of notation that allows @val(x)=@val(y) to stand for (x)= (y) since it makes the partial nature of the relationship clear.
Evidential reasoning in probability theory
In probability theory we can make use of Bayes' rule to establish values such as p(ajc) from values such as p(cja) and thus to establish how qualitative probabilities Proof: 27 The qualitative value of dp(c)=dp(a) is determined by p(cja)?p(cj:a) 12 and so that of dp (a) Thus a probabilistic in uence propagates in the reverse direction exactly as it does in the forward direction, a result which agrees with that of Wellman 6 as well as intuition.
Evidential reasoning in possibility theory
For in uences quanti ed using possibility values, it is possible to perform evidential propagation using a possibilistic version of Bayes' rule provided by Dubois and Prade 28 . This states that the joint possibility distribution over A and C is the same whichever end of the link joining A and C the calculation of the joint value starts from: min (cja); (a) = min (ajc); (c) (9) min (:cja); (a) = min (aj:c); (:c)
This result enables us to obtain: Theorem 2 For A ! C and for all x 2 fc; :cg and y 2 fa; :ag, (y) may follow (x) up i (x) follows (y) or (x) may follow (y) up, and (y) may follow (x) down i (x) may follow (y) down or (x) is independent of (y).
Proof: The lengthy proof of this theorem may be found in a previous paper 13 .2
Thus reversing a possibilistic link is similar to reversing a probabilistic link, but gives less precise results. When a link that propagates forward so that its consequent follows its antecedent is reversed, it is only possible to say that its antecedent may follow its consequent. Similarly, when a link that blocks propagation, so that the consequent is una ected by changes in the antecedent, is reversed, the antecedent may follow the consequent. Just as in the probabilistic case the result agrees with intuition|the evidential propagation is roughly the same as the predictive propagation|but is complicated by the use that possibility theory makes of max and min. As a result it is always possible that a change in value at one end of a link will not be propagated because the change in value was not su cient to pass the threshold at which the value at the other end alters. Similarly, just because a change in the predictive direction is blocked by a link, a change in the evidential direction need not be.
Evidential reasoning in evidence theory
To enable evidential reasoning across in uences that are quanti ed with belief functions, Smets' has provided a generalisation of Bayes' theorem 24;29 which makes it possible to calculate conditional beliefs such as bel(a j c) from conditional beliefs such as bel(cja). For A ! C we have, for any a A, c C:
bel(cjy) (11) wherex is the set-theoretic complement of x with respect to X, namely X ? x.
Using this rule gives:
Theorem 3 Thus reversing evidential links with Smets' version of Bayes' rule has the e ect of making the relationship between the antecedent of the original link and its consequent such that the belief in the antecedent may follow changes in the belief in the consequent. This seems sensible when the forward propagation is carried out using the disjunctive rule since using this rule means that the consequent always follows the antecedent 12 making it sensible that the antecedent may follow consequent on reversal. However, when Dempster's rule is used the behaviour of this belief function version of Bayes' theorem seems less satisfactory. Using Dempster's rule, it is possible for bel(c) to vary inversely with bel(a) when reasoning predictively. In such a case it would seem odd that bel(a) may follow bel(c) when the link is reversed. Thus the result suggests that further investigation of Smets' generalised Bayes' theorem would be fruitful, and it is possible that other forms of Bayes' rule that conform to evidence theory and yet have di erent e ects may be proposed.
Examples of evidential reasoning
Late last year, Cody Pomeroy wrote a long letter to his friend Jack Dulouz in which he mentioned that he had just taken a job xing tyres at the local tyre shack. In the letter he complained about the manager of the tyre shack, a most unscrupulous sort, who immediately sacks any employee if they become ill, or if he nds out that they do not have the relevant certi cate of competance in xing tyres. This made Jack worry about Cody's prospects, since he was well aware both of Cody's fragile health and the fact that Cody had no certi cate, and he went to the lengths of drawing up the directed graph in Figure 1 in order to analyse the problem. In the graph node I represents the variable \Ill", IQD represents the variable \Invented quali cation discovered", and LJ represents the variable \Lose Job".
Some time later, earlier this year in fact, in a telephone call to Evelyn, Cody's wife, Jack learnt that Cody had indeed lost his job. This made him re-analyse the situation using his direct graph model, to see what it told him about the reasons for Cody's dismissal.
Since Jack has no numerical information about the behaviour of Cody's employer, he is forced to use qualitative methods to carry out his reasoning. As a result he builds his model on the basis that an adequate description of the manager's behaviour is that the certainty value of the proposition \Lose job" must follow the certainty values of the propositions \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered". This knowledge is su cient, along with the results obtained above, to permit Jack to update his model with the knowledge that Cody has lost his job. If Jack reasons using probability theory, he can use Theorem 1 to discover that the probabilities of both \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered" follow that of \Lose job", so that they increase with the new knowledge. Alternatively, if Jack uses belief functions to quantify his model, he can use Theorem 3 to discover that the belief in both \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered" may follow that in \Lose job", so that belief in both propositions may increase with the new knowledge|that is it either increases or does not change. Finally, Jack might use possibility theory in his model. In this case, the fact that the possibility of \Lose job" follows the possibilities of \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered", means that applying Theorem 2 tells Jack that the possibilities of both \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered" may follow that of \Lose job" up. Thus knowledge of Cody's dismissal leads to the fact that the possibilities of \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered" may increase.
Intercausal reasoning
The results in Section 3 along with those presented previously 12 make it possible to perform both causal and evidential reasoning using qualitative probability, possibility and belief values in singly connected networks. These modes of reasoning are su cient to deal with many problems, but it is worth considering another important style of reasoning|intercausal reasoning. This is a pattern of reasoning between causes that are dependent on an observed common e ect. In this section the approach introduced above is applied to analyse intercausal reasoning in probability, possibility and evidence theories.
The basic network in which intercausal reasoning takes place is that of Figure 2 which we will refer to this network as B&C ! D. Here B and C are conditionally independent when the value of D is not known, and both are causes of D. When D is observed to take the value d, it is often the case that as evidence is obtained for b the degree of support for c is altered since val(c) and val(b) are no longer independent. Thus, to take the classic 10 example, b could be the hypothesis \The sprinkler was on", c could be the hypothesis \It rained last night" and d could be the hypothesis \The grass is wet". If the grass is known to be wet one morning, then observing something that makes it more likely that the sprinkler was on, say by tripping over the hose on the lawn, makes it less likely that it rained. In this case the relationship between b and c is a negative one, and evidence for b is said to explain away c. However, it is also possible that evidence for b might make c more certain or fail to in uence it.
Further results in qualitative uncertainty 12 
Intercausal reasoning in probability theory
To analyse the behaviour of the network we can write down an expression for p ( Writing K for p(d j b) ?1 , we then have dp(b)=dp(c) = ?K 2 p(djb) p(:b)(dp(d j :b)=dp(c)) + p(d j :b) dp(:b)=dp(c) + 1 ? p(d j :b)p(:b) dp(d j b)=dp(c) . Since dp(b)=dp(c) = ?dp(:b)=dp(c), dp(b)=dp(c) p(djb) Further results in qualitative uncertainty 13 varying with p(c) and p(:c) complete the proof. 2
Thus the qualitative relation between the probabilities of B and C is determined by the qualitative relation between the probabilities of B and D and the qualitative relation between the probabilities of C and D. Clearly the case in which explaining away occurs is that in which p(b) varies inversely with p(c), and it is worth noting that the relationship between B and C is symmetrical so that if, for instance, p(b) is explained away by p(c), then p(c) is explained away by p(b). The conditions seem entirely reasonable, and may be justi ed by the following argument. If the probability of d tends to follow that of p(c), and p(c) increases, then the joint probability of b, c and d increases as p(c) increases and when p(d) is not xed, this will cause it to increase. If, however, the probability of d is xed, there must be some change in p(b) to o set the change in the joint value, and if p(d) follows p(b) this means that p(b) must decrease. Similarly, if p(d) follows p(c) and varies inversely with p(b), p(b) must increase as p(c) increases in order to o set the change that would otherwise occur in the joint probability.
Whilst this explanation seems an adequate justi cation of the kind of intercausal relationship implied by Theorem 4, the fact that the conditions are on the relationship between the probability of D and its causes, rather than simply on the product of the conditional values of D given its causes, makes it clear that the notion of \explaining away" that is captured here is rather di erent to that of other authors such as Druzdzel, Henrion and Wellman 20;21 .
As an aside, it should be pointed out that our explanation of the way in which the probabilities alter is similar to that used in the argument put forward by Tzeng Thus we can have a form of explaining away in possibility theory, although it is a rather limited one. The inverse relationship between (b) and (c) can only be expressed in such a way that (b) increases as (c) falls. Thus it is the case that evidence for C not taking value c explains B taking value b rather than evidence for C taking value c explaining away B taking value b. In addition there cannot be a positive relationship between B and C so that (b) can never follow (c). For this form of intercausal reasoning between B and C to occur in possibility theory, the conditional possibilities must be such that it is less possible for B and C to respectively take values :b and :c than to take values b and :c suggesting some kind of exclusivity between the values. It is also necessary that (d) would be a ected by a change in value of (c) were it not xed, and as discussed above this seems an entirely reasonable restriction.
It is worth noting that, unlike the case in probability theory, prediction of explaining away in possibility theory requires explicit knowledge of the quantitiative Further results in qualitative uncertainty 15 possibility values as well as some information about qualitative relations.
Intercausal reasoning in evidence theory
When modelling the situation depicted in Figure 2 (1) bel(x) varies inversely with bel(y) i bel(d) follows both bel(x) and bel(y), or bel(d) varies inversely with both bel(x) and bel(y); (2) bel(x) follows bel(y) i bel(d) follows bel(x) and varies inversely with bel(y), or bel(d) varies inversely with bel(x) and follows bel(y); (3) bel(x) is independent of bel(y) i bel(d) is independent of bel(y) and is not independent of bel(x); (4) Under all other conditions, the relationship between bel(x) and bel(y) is indeterminate.
Proof: There are two cases. In the rst, we have conditionals such as bel(djb; c). (2) is zero and (1) is not. However, (1) and (2) are exactly the expressions that determine the relationship between bel(d) and bel(b) and bel(c) 12 , such that bel(d) follows bel(b) when (1) is positive, varies inversely with bel(b) when (1) is negative, follows bel(c) when (2) is positive and varies inversely with bel(c) when (2) Thus for explaining away to take place in evidence theory, the conditions that must be met are analagous to those for probability theory, and suggest that the same kind of mechanism is at work. If bel(d) follows bel(c) and bel(b) when it is not xed, then when it is xed the in ow of belief into the joint distribution over D, B and C from increasing bel(c) must be matched by a decrease in bel(b). Similarly, if bel(d) follows bel(c) and varies inversely with bel(b), then when bel(d) is xed, the increased belief over all three variables in question that results from an increase in bel(c) must be o set by a decrease in bel(b).
As mentioned above, it is also possible to combine the e ects of B and C on D using Smets' disjunctive rule 24 . The idea behind this rule is that it should establish the belief in the disjunction of two events for which the belief in their occurence is known in the same way that Dempster's rule 19 establishes the belief in the conjunction of the events. When the disjunctive rule is used we indicate its adoption by referring to the network of Figure 2 Thus if there is any intercausal reasoning when the disjunctive rule is used, it is in the form of explaining away. Given the behaviour reported in Theorem 7 for combination using Dempster's rule, and the fact that under the disjunctive rule bel(d) will always follow bel(b) and bel(c) 12 , this result is not surprising. It does, however, have some consequences for the expressiveness of the networks that one may build using belief functions and the disjunctive rule. Indeed, the practical result of Theorem 8 is that it is not possible to construct a network of the form 
Examples of intercausal reasoning
Following his initial thoughts about Cody's dismissal, Jack telephones him to discuss the matter. During the conversation, in which Cody talks of his desire to become a brakeman on the railroad, Jack learns that, although he is not sure of the matter, Cody reckons that the manager did not nd out about his lack of quali cation. Armed with this new information, Jack sits down to reason once again about the situation using the same model as before (for convenience repeated in Figure 3) .
Given his initial probabilistic model, in which \Lose job" follows both \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered", Jack can apply Theorem 4 to determine that, given he knows \Lose job" is true, evidence against \Invented quali cation discovered" is evidence for \Ill" since the probability of the latter varies inversely with that of the former. Thus, since on Cody's evidence the probability of \Invented quali cation discovered" may fall, the probability that Cody was ill may increase. He get similar results with his evidence theory model. The fact that in the model his belief in \Lose job" follows his belief in both \Ill" and \Invented quali cation discovered" means that whether he combines his beliefs with Dempster's rule or Smets' disjunctive rule, Theorems 7 and 8 tell him that his belief in \Ill" may vary inversely with his belief in \Invented quali cation dicovered" giving the same result as in the probabilistic case.
Things are a little di erent if Jack chooses to use a possibilistic model. In this case, he cannot get away without using some numerical values since these values themselves are needed to use Theorem 6. After some thought, he settles on the possibility values in Table 1 which t with his feelings about Cody's employer as well as the health and educational status of the tyre shack employees while ensuring that the possibility of \Lose job", (lj), follows both those of \Ill", (i), and \Invented quali ciation discovered", (iqd), in accordance with his initial information. Now, One of the applications of predictive reasoning using qualitative uncertainty is the integration of di erent formalisms 12;14;32 .
In this section we demonstrate the use of the results obtained in previous sections in the integration of di erent formalisms in evidential and intercausal reasoning. To do this we use the following medical example. The network of Figure 4 encodes the medical information that joint trauma (T) leads to loose knee bodies (K), and that these and arthritis (A) cause pain (P). The incidence of arthritis is in uenced by dislocation (D) of the joint in question and by the patient su ering from Sjorgen's syndrome (S) . Sjorgen's syndrome a ects the incidence of vasculitis (V ), and vasculitis leads to vasculitic lesions (L). Consider further a scenario 12;14;32 in which the in uences between the nodes are quanti ed using a mixture of probability, possibility and belief values for exactly the same reasons that a mixture of formalisms are used in MILORD 33;34 |the only quantitative information that is available is expressed in di erent formalisms. Thus the relationship between T and K, S and V and D; S and A is expressed using probability, that between V and L using possibility theory, and that between K, A and P using evidence theory. Now, we are told that, by applying previous results for the propagation of qualitative uncertainty in a predictive direction 12 one can tell that p(k) follows p(t), p(a) follows p(s), bel(p) follows bel(a) and bel(k), p(v) varies inversely with p(s) and (l) may follow (v) down. Given that a particular patient is in pain, how will an observation that suggests that the patient does not have vasculitic lesions a ect the probability that they are su ering from joint trauma?
To answer this question we must propagate the e ect of the change in the value of (l) to nd the e ect on p(k) and to do this we need to combine changes in values expressed in di erent formalisms. Previously we have suggested that this may be achieved by means of the so-called monotonicity assumption, a heuristic which states that:
If the value of a hypothesis in one formalism increases, the value of the same hypothesis in any other formalism does not decrease.
known to be in pain, evidence against vasculitic lesions may mean that she is less likely to be su ering from joint trauma.
Conclusions
The above results generalise the kind of qualitative propagation of values that may be carried out using a mixture of probability, possibility and belief values, making it possible to propagate in an evidential direction and between the causes of an observed e ect. The work is useful for two reasons. Firstly this work has provided an analysis of the patterns of intercausal reasoning, such as \explaining away", in possibility and evidence theories| something that has not been previously attempted. This analysis has shown that explaining away occurs under speci c, but very similar, circumstances in probability and evidence theories when the latter employes Dempster's rule of combination, and may always occur in evidence theory if Smets' disjunctive rule is employed along with binary variables. This semi-obligatory x nature of explaining away when the disjunctive rule is used rules out other forms of intercausal reasoning that are possible in probability theory and when Dempster's rule is used. Intercausal reasoning is also observed in possibility theory, albeit in a limited way such that \explaining away" does not occur, and again this only occurs under speci c circumstances. Comparing the results with those of work in qualitative probabilistic networks it seems that the approach discussed here, whilst broadly being a generalisation of the work of Wellman 6 and Druzdzel and Henrion 20 captures a slightly di erent notion of intercausal reasoning. Secondly, this work extends the range of situations in which it is possible to integrate information expressed in di erent formalisms from cases of predictive reasoning 12;13 to any situation in which the dependency between variables can be expressed using a singly connected network. This means that the approach now has a much wider scope, and can be applied to a much wider range of problems.
